Content of review 1, reviewed on October 02, 2017

Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2016 ) delve into a much needed technical and philosophical dissertation regarding the differences between typical (mis)interpretations of frequentist confidence intervals and the typical correct interpretation of Bayesian credible intervals. My contribution here partly strengthens Morey et al.’s argument, partly closes some gaps they left open, and concludes with a note of attention to the possibility that there may be distinctions without real practical differences in the ultimate use of estimation by intervals, namely when assuming a common ground of uninformative priors and intervals as ranges of values instead of as posterior distributions per se.

I will break down my commentary into relevant sections, starting with definitions, followed by coverage intervals, countable intervals, credible intervals and final notes. As far as practicable, I will quote Morey et al. before commenting, so that the article gets a clearer cue-response structure.

[Full review available as a preprint on PsyArXiv, https://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/KVXC4]

Source

    © 2017 the Reviewer (CC BY 4.0).

References

    D., M. R., Rink, H., N., R. J., D., L. M., Eric-Jan, W. 2016. The fallacy of placing confidence in confidence intervals. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.